The net amount of deep out-of-the-money (DOTM) S&P 500 put options that public investors purchase (or equivalently, the amount that financial intermediaries sell) in a month is a strong predictor of future market excess returns. A one-standard deviation decrease in our public net buy-to-open measure (PNBO) is associated with a 3.4% increase in the subsequent 3-month market excess return. The predictive power of PNBO is especially strong during the 2008-09 financial crisis, and it cannot be accounted for by a wide range of standard return predictors, nor by measures of tail risks or funding constraints. Moreover, PNBO is contemporaneously negatively related to the expensiveness of the DOTM puts. To explain these findings, we build a dynamic general equilibrium model in which financial institutions play a key role in sharing tail risks. The time variation in the financial institutions' intermediation capacity drives both the equilibrium demand for crash insurance and the market risk premium. Our results suggest that trading activities in the crash insurance market is informative about the degree of financial intermediary constraints.
Introduction
Trading activities in the market of deep out-of-the-money put options on the S&P 500 index (DOTM SPX puts) is informative about the market risk premium and the degree of financial intermediary constraints. We construct a measure of the net amount of DOTM SPX puts that public investors acquire each month (henceforth referred to as PNBO), which also reflects the net amount of the same options that broker-dealers and market makers sell in that month. PNBO is negatively related to the expensiveness of the DOTM puts relative to the at-the-money options. Moreover, PNBO predicts future market returns negatively. A one-standard deviation drop in PNBO is associated with a 3.4% increase in the subsequent 3-month stock market excess return. Over the whole sample, the R 2 for the predictability regression is 17.4%.
This predictive power of PNBO is distinct from that of the standard return predictors in the literature, such as price-earnings ratio, dividend yield, consumption-wealth ratio, variance risk premium, default spread, term spread, and tail risk measures. The inclusion of PNBO also drives out measures of financial intermediary funding constraints such as the TED spread and changes in broker-dealer leverage in a predictability regression. Moreover, the predictive power of PNBO is time-varying and was particularly strong during the recent financial crisis. When estimating the predictive regression with PNBO using a 5-year moving window, the R 2 changes from less than 5% most of the time prior to 2006 to close to 50% during the crisis period.
While previous studies have documented that public investors are typically net buyers of DOTM SPX puts during normal times, the net public purchase of DOTM SPX puts turned significantly negative during the peak of the 2008-2009 financial crisis, suggesting that the broker-dealers and market makers switched from net sellers into buyers of market crash insurances. The SPX option volume data do not allow us to directly identify which types of public investors (retail or institutional) were selling the DOTM puts during the crisis. However, a comparison of the public investor trading activities in the market for SPX vs. SPY options (the latter is an option on the SPDR S&P 500 ETF Trust and has a significantly higher percentage of retail investors than SPX options), as well a comparison between large and small public orders of SPX puts suggest that it is the institutional investors (e.g., hedge funds) who were selling the DOTM puts to the financial intermediaries.
To explain these empirical findings, we build a dynamic general equilibrium model of the crash insurance market. Financial intermediaries (dealers) are net providers of such insurance under normal conditions, which could be because they are better at managing crash risk than the public investors, or because they are less concerned with crash risk due to agency problems. 1 Over time, the risk sharing capacity of the intermediaries changes due to endogenous trading losses and exogenous shocks to the intermediation capacity.
We capture these features in reduced form by assuming that the financial intermediaries are more optimistic about crash risk than public investors during normal times, and that their aversion to crash risk changes over time due to exogenous intermediation shocks.
In the model, public investors' equilibrium demand for crash insurance depends on the level of crash risk in the economy, the wealth distribution between public investors and the financial intermediary, and shocks to the intermediation capacity. As the probability of market crash rises, all else equal, public investors' demand for crash insurance tends to rise. However, if the financial intermediaries' risk sharing capacity drops at the same time due to loss of wealth or increase in crash aversion, the equilibrium amount of risk sharing can become smaller. Furthermore, because of reduced risk sharing, public investors now demand a higher premium for bearing crash risk. This mechanism can generate significant variation in market risk premium due to the high sensitivity of market risk premium to the amount of risk sharing of tail risks as shown in Chen, Joslin, and Tran (2012) .
Empirically, the market for deep out-of-the-money SPX puts closely resembles the crash insurance market in our model for two reasons. First, while the financial intermediaries can partially hedge the risks of their option inventories by trading futures and over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, the hedge is imperfect and costly. This is especially true for DOTM puts, which are highly sensitive to jump risks that are more difficult to hedge. Thus, the impact of intermediation capacity is likely to be more significant for these options. Second, while DOTM index puts are not the only way to hedge against crash risks, compared to OTC derivatives, SPX puts provide unique advantages in that the central counterparty clearing and margin system largely removes the counterparty risks and enhances liquidity.
Our paper builds on and extends the work of Garleanu, Pedersen, and Poteshman (2009) (henceforth GPP), who develop a partial equilibrium model demonstrating how exogenous public demand shocks affect option prices when risk-averse dealers have to bear the inventory risk. In their model, the dealers' intermediation capacity is fixed, and the model implies a positive relation between the public demand for options and the option premium. Like GPP, the limited intermediation capacity of the dealers is a central feature of our model, but we introduce shocks to the intermediation capacity and endogenize the public demand for options, option pricing, and aggregate market risk premium jointly in general equilibrium. In our model, the relation between the equilibrium demand for the put options and the option premium can be either positive or negative.
Our paper contributes to the literature on the impact of financial intermediary constraints on asset pricing and the real economy. Recent theoretical contributions include Gromb and Vayanos (2002) , Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) , Geanakoplos (2009), He and Krishnamurhty (2012) , Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2013) , Gertler and Kiyotaki (2013) , among others. As shown in several of these models, the financing constraints change the effective risk aversion of the intermediaries. Motivated by this insight, we directly model intermediation shocks via dealers' time-varying risk aversion towards crash risks, which makes the model analytically tractable and easy to calibrate. Similar to Adrian and Boyarchenko (2012) , who explicitly model a risk-based capital constraint for intermediaries, both the dealer net worth and leverage drive market prices of risk in our model. We also provide new evidence consistent with the prediction of intermediary constraints influencing the pricing of financial assets and the aggregate risk premium.
Different from earlier empirical studies by , Adrian, Moench, and Shin (2010) , and Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2012) , who use intermediary leverage to measure the constraint, our measure is based on financial intermediaries' options positions, which has the advantage of being forward-looking and available at high (daily) frequency. Pan and Poteshman (2006) show that option trading volume predicts near future individual stock returns (up to 2 weeks). They find the source of this predictability to be the nonpublic information possessed by option traders. In contrast, our evidence of return predictability applies to a market index and to longer horizons (up to 4 months). Moreover, we argue that the economic source of this predictability is time-varying intermediary constraints. Hong and Yogo (2012) find that open interests in commodity futures are pro-cyclical and predict commodity returns positively. Our measure of net public purchase is different from open interest. If public investors only trade among themselves (e.g., due to heterogeneous beliefs, risk aversion, or background risks), there will be large open interest but zero net public purchase for options. Moreover, the return predictability we find for net public purchase is negative, opposite to that of open interest in Hong and Yogo (2012) .
Several studies have examined the role that the derivatives markets play in the aggregate economy. Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006) study option pricing and trading volume when investors have incomplete and heterogeneous information. Bates (2008) shows how options can be used to complete the markets in the presence of crash risk. Longstaff and Wang (2012) show that the credit market plays an important role in facilitating risk sharing among heterogeneous investors. Chen, Joslin, and Tran (2012) show that the aggregate market risk premium is highly sensitive to the amount of risk sharing of tail risks in equilibrium.
Empirical Evidence
In this section, we present the empirical evidence connecting the trading activities of deep out-of-the-money S&P 500 put options (DOTM SPX puts) between public investors and financial intermediaries to the pricing of these options and the risk premium of the aggregate stock market.
Data and variables
The data used to construct our option demand measures are from the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). The Options Clearing Corporation classifies each option trade into one of three categories based on who initiates the trade. They include public investors (or customers), firm investors, and market makers. Transactions initiated by public investors include those made by retail investors and those by institutional investors such as hedge funds or mutual funds. Trades initiated by firm investors correspond to those that the securities broker-dealers (who are not designated market makers) make for their own accounts or for another broker-dealer. The SPX options volume data are available at daily frequency from 1991 to 2012. Option pricing and open interest data are obtained from the OptionMetrics for the period of 1996 to 2012.
Our main option volume variable is PNBO, which is defined as the total open-buy orders of all the DOTM SPX puts (with strike-to-price ratio K/S ≤ 0.85) by public
investors minus their open-sell orders on the same set of options in each month. We use the strike-to-price ratio to classify DOTM options because it is parsimonious and model-independent. Later on we also present he results based on other strike-to-price cutoffs as well as moneyness cutoffs that adjust for option maturity and recent volatility of the S&P 500 index. We focus on open orders (orders to open new positions) because Pan and Poteshman (2006) and others have shown that these orders can be more informative than close orders. For comparison, we also consider the measure PNB, which is the public investors' net buying volume that includes both open and close orders.
Since options are in zero net supply, the amount of net buying by the public investors is equal to the amount of net selling by the firm investors and market makers. Since our focus is to connect option market trading activities to the constraints of financial intermediaries, it is natural to group the firm investors (securities broker-dealers) together with the market makers. Two additional volume measures we consider are: (i) PNBO normalized by the average SPX total volume in the previous 12 months (to adjust for the growth of the options market); (ii) FNBO, which is the net open-buying volume of DOTM SPX puts by firm investors. The fact that PNBO tends to drop significantly and become negative during market Our empirical analysis focuses on the relation between PNBO and the pricing of DOTM SPX puts, as well as between PNBO and the market risk premium. We use the implied volatility slope (the difference between the implied volatility of the DOTM and the ATM SPX puts with one month to maturity) to measure the relative expensiveness of the DOTM is also positive on average (at 2686 contracts), the correlation between PNBO and FNBO is −0.4, suggesting that firm investors, along with market makers, tend to be trading against the public investors as a whole. Unlike the standard return predictors such as price-earnings ratio, dividend yield, term spread, or consumption-wealth ratio, all of which are highly persistent, the option volume measures have relatively modest autocorrelations (e.g., 0.61 for PNBO and 0.37 for PNB).
The PNBO series is pro-cyclical, as indicated by its positive correlation with industrial production growth (0.17) and negative correlation with unemployment rate (−0.48). In addition, the correlation between PNBO and IVSlope is −0.46. Its correlation with changes in broker-dealer leverage ∆lev is 0.50, and the correlation with the leading 3-month market risk premium is −0.43. These results are consistent with the interpretation that dealer constraints matter for option pricing and market risk premium, which we examine formally in the following section.
Main results

Option Pricing
We first investigate the link between the net public open-purchase for DOTM index puts and the relative pricing of these options. The basic regression specification is:
which follows the specification in Garleanu, Pedersen, and Poteshman (2009) The demand pressure theory and the intermediary constraint theory offer opposite predictions on the sign of b IV . The former suggests that exogenous shocks to public demand for DOTM puts force risk-averse financial intermediaries to bear more inventory risks because the DOTM puts are difficult to delta-hedge, which lead them to raise the price of these options relative to others. In this case, b IV > 0. The latter considers a shock to the intermediation capacity of the broker-dealers and market-makers. As the financial intermediaries become more constrained, they reduce the supply of DOTM puts and demand a higher premium. The equilibrium public demand for DOTM SPX puts and the relative expensiveness of these options will then be negatively correlated, i.e., b IV < 0. Table 2 reports the regression results both for the full sample (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) and the sample period of the GPP study (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) . In the full sample, PNBO is negatively and statistically significantly related to IVSlope contemporaneously, which is consistent with the theory of intermediary constraints in that intermediation shocks are simultaneously affecting the equilibrium demand and pricing of the DOTM puts. The coefficient of Next, following GPP, we include the recent monthly profits and losses (P&L) for the market-makers and firm investors in the index options. 4 The monthly P&L is the sum of daily P&L computed as following on day t:
where N t−1 is the total number of SPX options on which market makers and firm investors have net open interest on day t − 1. NetOpenInt i t−1 is their net open interest on the ith options, P i t is the closing price of the ith options, delta i t−1 is the delta of the ith options on day t − 1 recorded in OptionsMatrices, 5 S t is the closing index price.
To the extent that the P&L in the option markets proxy for (negatively) how constrained the financial intermediaries are, the theory of intermediary constraints predicts that the regression coefficient on the intermediary P&L term should be negative (DOTM puts becoming more expensive after the intermediaries have suffered recent losses), while the coefficient on the interaction term between PNBO and intermediary P&L should be positive (the sensitivity of option expensiveness to PNBO is stronger after intermediary losses). Both predictions are confirmed by results from the full sample. Moreover, these results are robust to the inclusion of control variables including the variance premium (VRP), contemporaneous market returns, and the lagged IVSlope.
During the period of 1996 to 2001, GPP find that the aggregate public purchase for all index options are significantly positively correlated with their measure of the expensiveness of ATM options based on the difference between the implied volatility and a reference volatility from Bates (2006) . We find a positive (albeit insignificant) coefficient on PNBO in this period, but IVSlope and PNBO become significantly negatively related since then.
This change could be explained by the fact that financial intermediaries are relatively unconstrained in the early part of the sample, and that intermediation shocks only become significant in the latter part of the sample (in particular during the financial crisis in 2008-09).
Return forecasts
Having examined the relation between PNBO and the expensiveness of DOTM index puts, we now examine the relation between PNBO and market risk premium. We consider a standard return forecasting regression:
where the notation t + j → t + k indicates the leading period from t + j to t + k (k > j). Results of the OLS regressions of percent excess return of the market portfolio on PNBO ×10 −6 . r t+k indicates market excess return in the kth month ahead. r t→t+k indicates cumulative k-month market excess return. Standard errors in parentheses use GMM to correct for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation based on Hansen and Hodrick (1980) . The calculation of bootstrap confidence intervals follows Welch and Goyal (2008) . Sample period: 1991/01 -2012/12.
This return predictability regression is again motivated by two alternative theories.
First, it is possible that the financial intermediaries become more constrained when the market risk premium is high, e.g., due to high uncertainty in the real economy, which in turn reduces their capacity to provide market crash insurance (in the form of DOTM SPX puts) to public investors. The result is that a low PNBO today should predict high future market returns. However, in this case the intermediary constraint does not directly influence the market risk premium. Second, it is also possible that intermediary constraints directly affect the aggregate market risk premium rather than simply reflecting it, which is a prediction that arises in several equilibrium models of intermediary constraints, e.g., He and Krishnamurhty (2012) and Adrian and Boyarchenko (2012) . If the financial intermediaries play an important risk sharing role in the economy, then when they become more constrained, the market risk premium rises, which again results in a negative relation between PNBO and future market returns. The results are reported in Table 4 . For all alternative predictive variables, adding PNBO significantly raises the adjusted R 2 of the regression. Moreover, the coefficient on PNBO remains negative and statistically significant, and the size of the coefficient is similar across regressions. In contrast, only the variance risk premium, the log price-earnings ratio, and the consumption-wealth ratio are statistically significantly after PNBO is included in the regression.
The fact that the predictive power of PNBO remains statistically significant after controlling for other standard predictive variables suggests that there is unique information about market risk premium that is contained in option trading activities and not captured by the standard macro and financial factors that drive risk premium. This potentially allows us to disentangle the two alternative explanations of the negative relation between PNBO and future market returns as discussed above. If the intermediary constraint as proxied by PNBO merely reflects the aggregate risk premia rather than directly causing the fluctuations in risk premia, then the inclusion of the actual risk factors should drive out predictive power of PNBO. Of course, the evidence above does not prove that intermediary constraints actually drive aggregate risk premia. It is always possible that PNBO is correlated with some true risk factors that are not considered in our specifications. Results of the OLS regressions of percent excess return of the market portfolio on PNBO and other predictors. Variance risk premium (VRP), log price-earnings ratio (p − e), log dividend yield (d − p), TED spread (TED), Baa-Aaa credit spread (DEF), and the 10-year and 3-month Treasury term spread (TERM) are used in the monthly regressions, which forecasts 3-month ahead excess market returns r t→t+3 . Consumption-wealth ratio ( cay) and changes in Broker-Dealer leverage (∆lev) are available quarterly, which are used to predict next-quarter excess market return in a quarterly regression. Standard errors in parentheses use GMM to correct for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation based on Hansen and Hodrick (1980) . Sample period: 1991/01 -2012/12. is available quarterly with added reporting delay.
Besides the standard predictive variables in Table 4 , we also compare PNBO with several price-based tail risk measures, including the tail risk measure by Kelly (2012) (based on equity return information), and the implied volatility slope measures based on different moneyness. Table 5 shows that the IVslope measure from one month DOTM puts (for K/S ≤ 0.85 vs. K/S ∈ (0.85, 0.95)) are statistically significantly related future 3 month returns (t-stat=2.13) in the univariate regression, and becomes insignificant (t-stat=1.57) after controlling for PNBO. However, IVSlope measured from OTM puts has no power in predicting returns. Finally, in a joint regression, none of the price-based tail risk measures can account for the predictive power of PNBO.
The time variation in the predictive power of PNBO is illustrated in Figure 3 and ending in 2007/12 (with a minimum evaluation period of 5 years). This is because recent studies suggest that sample splits themselves can be data-mined (Hansen and Timmermann (2012)). We first estimate the predictability regression for 3-month market excess returns during the estimation period, and then compute the mean squared forecast errors for the predictability model (M SE A ) and the historical mean model (M SE N ) in the evaluation period. Then, the out-of-sample R 2 is
The figure shows PNBO achieving an out-of-sample R 2 above 10% for most sample splits, and remains above 20% since 2004. It also outperforms the variance risk premium (VRP, which is the strongest predictor besides PNBO among the predictors considered in Table 4 ) R 2 rises to close to 50%. Since such high R 2 would translate into striking Sharpe ratios for investment strategies that try to exploit such predictability, the fact that they persist during the financial crisis can be interpreted as evidence of the financial constraints that prevent arbitrageurs from taking advantages of such investment opportunities.
In Table 6 , we report the results of several robustness tests on PNBO. In the first row, we compare the regression results of PNBO in the full sample (1991/01-2012/12) against the results from two sub-samples: pre-crisis (1991/01-2007/11) and post-crisis (2009/06-2012/12). The predictive power of PNBO remains statistically significant in both sub-samples but is weaker than the full sample, both in terms of lower R 2 and weaker statistical significance of b r . These results show that the relation between option trading activities and market risk premium is stronger during the financial crisis, but it is not a phenomenon that occurs exclusively in the financial crisis. The weaker predictive power for PNBO in the earlier parts of the sample period could be due to the fact that intermediary constraint is not as significant and variable in the first half of the sample as in the second half (especially the crisis period). Another possible reason is that the options market was under-developed in the early periods of the sample and did not play as important a role in facilitating risk sharing as it does today.
Indeed, Figure 1 shows that PNBO is significantly more volatile in the second half of the sample, which is in part due to the dramatic growth of the trading volume in the options market during our sample period. To account for this effect, we normalize PNBO by the past 12-month average SPX total trading volume. As Table 6 shows, this normalized PNBO also predicts future one-month and 3-month cumulative market excess returns significantly. Figure 5 : Alternative definitions of moneyness. In Panels A and B, PNBO is measured based on put options with K/S less than a constant cutoff k. In Panels C and D, PNBO is measured on put options with K/S less than 1 + kσ, where k is a constant, and σ represents a maturity-adjusted return volatility, which is the daily S&P return volatility in the previous 30 trading days multiplied by the square root of the days to maturity for the option. cutoff rule K/S ≤ 0.85. A natural question is how the results change as we vary this cutoff.
The answer is shown in Panel A of Figure 5 . The coefficient b r in the return forecast regression is consistently negative for a wide range of moneyness cutoffs. On the one hand, b r becomes more negative as the cutoff k becomes lower, i.e., when we measure the net public open-purchase for deeper out-of-the-money puts. On the other hand, because far out-of-money options are more thinly traded, the PNBO series becomes more noisy, which widens the confidence interval on b r . In contrast, for almost all moneyness cutoffs, a PNBO measure based on SPX calls does not predict returns.
An objection to the definition of DOTM puts above is that a constant strike-to-price cutoff implies different actual moneyness (e.g., as measured by option delta) for options with different maturities. A 15% drop in price might seem very extreme in one day, but it becomes much more likely in one year. For this reason, we examine a maturity-adjusted moneyness definition. Specifically, we classify a put option as DOTM when
where k is a constant, σ t is the daily S&P return volatility in the previous 30 trading days, and T is the days to maturity for the option. Panel C of Figure 5 shows that this alternative classification of DOTM puts produces similar results as the simple cutoff rule.
Once again, Panel D shows that the PNBO series based on call options does not predict returns.
Determinants of the demand for DOTM puts
In this section, we investigate the determinants of demand for crash insurance. In our model, the dealers are less willing to provide crash insurance when they become more averse to jump risk. Such rise in risk aversion is a proxy for the fact the dealers are becoming more constrained. In this section, we present empirical evidence that the net public purchase for DOTM SPX puts is indeed connected to dealer constraints. Table 7 shows that PNBO is significantly positively related to changes in broker-dealer leverage. Consistent with the results in Table 2 , PNBO is also significantly negatively related to the slope of implied volatility of SPX options. In addition, from its positive relation with industrial productivity and negative relation with unemployment rate, we can see that the public purchase of DOTM SPX puts is high when the economy in a good state.
We further examine the relationship between the public demand for DOTM and changes in leverage by exploring the Granger causality. We do this by forming a bivariate VAR and testing for the significance of either public demand for DOTM in predicating future changes in leverage or vice versa. In both cases, we find evidence that Granger causality runs both at the 2.5% level or lower in all cases and this hold for either the VAR with fixed p = 1 lag or when we use the AIC or BIC criterion to optimally select the lag (p = 7 and p = 4, respectively.) We note also that there is little evidence that market returns granger cause demand for DOTM puts; the p-values in the associated hypothesis tests are all 0.68 or above for the different specifications.
Who sold the DOTM puts in the crisis?
As Figure 1 shows, the amount of DOTM SPX puts that public investors sold to the broker-dealers and market makers in the period following the Lehman bankruptcy is quite large. It will be useful to find out who among the public investors sold the crash insurance to the constrained financial intermediaries during the crisis. However, the SPX volume data do not separate trades by retail investors from those by institutional investors. We use two strategies to answer this question. First, we compare the trading activities of the public investors in SPX options with those in SPY options. Second, we compare the trading activities of large against small orders in SPX options. We also compare the ability of PNBO SP Y and PNBO SP X in predicting market excess returns. As Table 8 shows, PNBO SP Y has no significant predictive power for future market returns at any horizon, and the coefficient on PNBO SP Y is even positive for one-month ahead market excess returns, while PNBO SP X significantly predicts market returns with high R 2 in the same period.
Next, we compare the predictive power of PNBO based on orders of different sizes.
The SPX option volume data classify trades into large orders (more than 200 contracts per trade), medium orders (between 100 and 200 contracts), and small orders (less than 100 contracts). To the extent that institutional investors tend to execute large orders while retail investors trade in small orders, a comparison of PNBO large and PNBO small can also reveal the different behaviors of the two groups of public investors. Table 8 shows PNBO large has significant predictive power for future market returns. While PNBO small is also negatively related to future market returns, the relation is statistically insignificant, and the R 2 is much smaller. These comparisons suggest that it is the institutional investors who sold the DOTM put options to the financial intermediaries during the crisis period.
A Dynamic Model
In Section 2, we document a number of features of the market for crash insurance. In particular, there is time-varying equilibrium demand for crash insurance from public investors. The equilibrium demand is inversely related to the relative price of the out-ofthe-money put protection-times in which the equilibrium demand is low are generally times when the protection is very expensive. The demand for crash insurance was also informative about future stock market returns over and above the information in option prices and macro-variables. We now examine an equilibrium model consistent with these empirical facts.
As our model elaborates, the main mechanism we have in mind is a model whereby a public sector and intermediary face time-varying risk of a disaster. In general, the intermediary is more willing to bear the downside risk of the disaster. However, as the amount of risk rises, the intermediary becomes less willing (or less able) to share the risk of a crash. These ingredients allow us to capture our key empirical results.
A Simple Model with Intermediary Constraints
We first consider a simple model that illustrates the main mechanism for the negative relationship between public purchase of out-of-the-money options and subsequent market returns. The key feature of our model will be that as the amount of risk rises, the public demand curve will (necessarily) shift up, but the equilibrium demand will go down. This will follow because the dealer's supply curve will shift up more and the market clearly price will imply the lower equilibrium quantity. In our simple model, this will follow because the dealer faces a tighter capital constraints. This suggests that the tightness of dealer constraints can be understood in reduced form as time-variation in effective risk aversion, an observation made by , He and Krishnamurhty (2012) (2011), and others.
To illustrate the idea, consider a two-period model with two agents: a public investor and a dealer. We suppose that both agents have power utility over wealth in the second (final) period, with constant relative risk aversion γ. There are two possible states in the second period: a good state and a bad state, which occur with probability 1 − λ and λ, respectively. The public investor receives a lower endowment in the bad state than in the good state (W P H > W P L ), while the dealer's endowment is riskless (W D H = W D L = W 0 ). The heterogeneity in background risk generates the motive for trading in the form of the dealer writing insurance to the public investor against the bad state. Without loss of generality, we assume the insurance contract is an Arrow-Debreu security that pays off 1 unit of wealth in the bad state, and that the riskfree rate is normalized to 0. We also denote the number of insurance contracts the dealer sells by n, and the price of the contract by p.
Next, we assume that the dealer faces an exogenous constraint on his total risk exposure.
Specifically, the constraint is that the conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) at level q cannot exceed a fraction c of his wealth. The CVaR, which is also referred to as the expected shortfall, is defined as the average value-at-risk (VaR) with confidence level from 0 to q:
The resulting equilibrium is plotted in Figure 6 , where we consider the cases of a low and high probability of disaster. We see that as the amount of risk rises, the demand curve for the public rises. However, at the same time the supply curve falls and the CVaR constraint begins to bind. The result is that as risk rises, the equilibrium quantity falls.
Moreover, as indicated by the dashed black line, the same equilibrium quantity would be obtained if instead of the constraint binding more with higher levels of risk, the dealer was instead more risk averse as the amount of risk went up.
This simple comparative static exercise shows that the relationship between the about of risk and the amount of trade depends crucially on how the risk-sharing capacity of the dealer changes with the level of crash risk in the economy. In reality, the dealers are large financial institutions, and many factors could changes their risk-sharing capacity, including losses in wealth from other investments, regulatory changes on capital requirement, and beliefs about government guarantees. Another observation from this example is that we can arrive at the same equilibrium if instead of imposing the CVaR constraint, we assume the dealer's risk aversion rises as the crash risk increases.
It is worth noting that this mechanism differs from other studies that focus on market makers or arbitrageurs to share risk with public investors with exogenous stochastic demand.
For example, in Garleanu, Pedersen, and Poteshman (2009) , demand is specified as an exogenous process. Vayanos and Vila (2009) and Greenwood and Vayanos (2012) also focus on public investors who have exogenous demand curves. In these papers, public investors are models as having flat demand curve (or alternatively as having exogenously specified equilibrium demand). Such approaches cannot immediately reconcile our empirical finding without introducing the possibility or correlation between the risk bearing capacity of the market makers with the public demand.
A Full Dynamic Model
We now present a dynamic model for the market of crash insurance. Our model builds on Chen, Joslin, and Tran (2012) which is based on disagreement about a time-varying disaster probability. We extend their model by incorporating time-variation in the dealer's aversion to crash risk. Similar alternative models could be based purely on time-varying risk aversion or dealer constraints.
We consider an aggregate endowment in the economy which follows a jump diffusion process where the endowment is subject to both a diffusive risk and a jump risk. In particular, sudden severe drops in the aggregate endowment are a source of disaster risk in this economy. There are two types of agents in the economy: small public investors and competitive dealers. We assume there exists a representative public investor, who is denoted by agent P , and a representative dealer, denoted by agent D. To induce the two types of agents to trade, we assume that they have different beliefs about the probability of disasters. As discussed earlier, such differences in beliefs capture in reduced form the advantages that dealers have in bearing disaster risk, whether it is due to differences in technology, agency problems, or behavioral biases.
Specifically, we assume that both agents believe that the log aggregate endowment c t = log C t follows the process
whereḡ and σ c are the expected growth rate and volatility of consumption without jumps, W c t is a standard Brownian motion under both agents' beliefs,d is the constant size of consumption drop in a diaster 6 . N t is a counting process whose jumps arrive with stochastic intensity λ t under the public investors' beliefs,
whereλ is the long-run average jump intensity under P 's beliefs, and W λ t is a standard Brownian motion independent of W c t . In general, the dealers are more willing to bear the disaster risk because (they act as if) they are more optimistic about disaster risk.
We assume that they believe that the disaster intensity is given by ρλ t with ρ < 1. We summarize the public investors' beliefs with the probability measure P P , and the dealers' beliefs with the probability measure P D .
Public investors have standard constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility:
where we focus on the cases where γ > 1. The superscript P reflects that the expectations are taken under the public investors' beliefs.
The utility function of the dealers are different. We assume that the dealers face an intermediation constraint that we model in a reduced form directly in terms of their utility.
Specifically, we suppose that
where α t is a stochastic variable representing the ability of the dealer to intermediate disaster risk. Limited ability to intermediate risk is modeled as increased risk aversion against market crashes. The specification generalizes the state-dependent preferences proposed by Bates (2008) in that it allows the dealers' risk aversion against crashes to rise with the probability of disasters.
Specifically, τ (n) is the time of the n th disaster since t = 0, τ (n) ≡ inf{s : N s = n}
Thus, this crash-aversion term remains constant in between disasters. Suppose the dealer's log consumption drops by d D,τ (n) at the time of the n th disaster. Then, at the same time, the marginal utility of the dealer jumps up by
which implies that the dealer's effective relative risk aversion against the disaster is
Thus, when α t >ᾱ, the dealers will have lower aversion to disaster risk than public investors. As α t falls, the dealer's effective risk aversion rises.
The intermediation capacity of the dealers may be related to the disaster intensity.
We model the intermediation as being driven jointly by the disaster intensity, λ t , and an independent factor, x t , so that α t = −aλ t + bx t . Thus when a > 0, the intermediation capacity goes down as the intensity rises and the dealer becomes more averse to disaster risk.
Any jointly affine process for (c t , λ t , x t ) would be suitable for a tractable specification.
For example, we could suppose that x t follows an independent CIR process:
In our calibrations, we will choose the simple specification with b = 0 so that the intermediation capacity is perfectly correlated with the disaster intensity.
The main motivation for dealers' time-varying aversion to crash risk is the time-varying constraint faced by financial intermediaries. Rising crash risk in the economy raises the intermediaries' capital/collateral requirements and tightens their constraints on tail risk exposures (e.g., Value-at-Risk constraints), which make them more reluctant to provide insurance against disaster risk. For example, see , He and Krishnamurhty (2012) . In this sense, the shocks to the disaster intensity in the model also serve the purpose of generating time variation in the intermediation capacity of the dealers. We can further generalize the specification by making the dealers' aversion to crash risk driven by adding independent variations in the intermediation shocks.
We also assume that markets are complete and agents are endowed with some fixed share of aggregate consumption (θ P , θ D = 1 − θ P ). The equilibrium allocations can be characterized as the solution of the following planner's problem, specified under the probability measure P P , max
subject to the resource constraint C P t + C D t = C t . Here, ζ is the the Pareto weight for the dealers and
where ρ =λ D /λ, the relative likelihood of a jump under the two beliefs. From the first order condition and the resource constraint, we obtain the equilibrium consumption 
The stochastic discount factor under P 's beliefs, M P t , is given by
We can solve for the Pareto weight ζ through the lifetime budget constraint for one of the agents (Cox and Huang (1989) ), which is linked to the initial allocation of endowment.
Our key focus will be on risk premiums and on the net public purchase for crash insurance which we relate to the market for deep out of the money puts in our empirical analysis. The risk premium for any security under each agent's beliefs is the difference between the expected return under P i and under the risk-neutral measure Q.
where we use the shorthand that ∂ B P denotes the sensitivity of the security to Brownian shocks and E d t [R] is the expected return of the security conditional on a disaster. Since consumption will be relatively smooth in our calibration, the return of securities which are not highly levered on the brownian risk will be dominated by the jump risk term.
Moreover, agents agree about the brownian risk and have the same risk aversion with respect to these shocks so there will be no variation in the Sharpe ratio for brownian risk.
In light of these facts, we focus on the variation in the jump risk premium, as measured by λ Q /λ P P .
The stochastic discount factor characterizes the unique risk neutral probability measure
t is determined by the expected jump size of the stochastic discount factor at the time of a disaster. When the risk-free rate and disaster intensity are close to zero, the risk-neutral disaster intensity λ Q t has the nice interpretation of (approximately) the value of a one-year crash insurance contract that pays one at t + 1 when a disaster occurs between t and t + 1.
In our setting, the risk-neutral jump intensity is given by
In order to define the market size, we must consider how the Pareto efficient allocation is obtained. The equilibrium allocations can be implemented through competitive trading in a sequential-trade economy. Extending the analysis of Bates (2008) , we can consider four types of traded securities: (i) a risk-free money market account, (ii) a claim to aggregate consumption, and (iii) a crash insurance contracts which pay green one dollar in the event of a disaster in exchange for a continuous premium. and (iv) a separate instrument sensitive only to shocks in the disaster intensity. As in Chen, Joslin, and Tran (2012) , since agents agree about the Brownian risk and have identical aversion to the risk, they will proportionally hold the risk according to their consumption share. With the instruments we have specified, this means they will proportionally hold the consumption claim. Thus the agents will hold proportional exposure to the disaster risk from their exposure to the consumption claim. Motivated by these facts, we define the net public purchase for crash insurance as the (scaled) difference between the consumption loss the public bears in equilibrium minus the consumption loss that the public would bear without insurance.
That is, the public purchase for insurance is the difference between e −d (f P (ζ d t ) − f P (ζ t− )) (whereζ d t is the value ofζ t conditional on a disaster occurring at time t:ζ d t = ρe α(λ t− −λ)ζ t− ) and e −d (f P (ζ d t ) − f P (ζ t− ). Thus we define the net public purchase for insurance to be net public purchase for crash insurance = e −d f P (ζ t ρe α(λ t− −λ) ) − f P (ζ t ) .
Net public purchase and risk premia in the dynamic model
We now study the relationship between public purchase and risk premia in the context of our dynamic model. We calibrate our model as in Chen, Joslin, and Tran (2012) and
Wachter (2012). The key new parameter that we introduce is the time-variation in aversion to jump risk. We parameterize this by setting a = αd/σ SS (λ) where σ SS (λ) is the volatility of the stationary distribution of λ. We choose α = 1, which together with the other parameters implies that when λ = 2.35% (one standard deviation from the steady state volatility (65 bp) above the long run mean (1.7%)), an economy populated by dealer will act as if they have a relative risk aversion of 5 with respect to jumps (one higher than if he had standard CRRA utility with γ = 4). As a baseline comparison, we also consider the parameterization with α = 0, which corresponds to the stochastic intensity model of Chen, Joslin, and Tran (2012) .
Fixing consumption share, net public purchase is monotonically decreasing in λ. A few ways to change this: start with low f t ; as λ t rises, make dealers lose money on other bets.
Another possibility is that the public investors risk aversion rises faster initially.
In our model, there are two state variable: λ t , the likelihood of disasters and f t , the public investors consumption share. Figure 7 plots the net public purchase for crash insurance as a function of the public consumption share and the jump intensity. When α = 0 (panel B), the amount of risk sharing does not depend on λ as the motivation to share risk depends only on the size of the size of the jump in consumption. The equilibrium public purchase is close to zero when either the public has a low consumption share (the public has limited resources to buy insurance) or when the public has high consumption share (the dealers have limited ability to provide insurance) with a peak in the middle Figure 8 : Disaster Risk Premium. The two panels plot the conditional disaster risk premium as a function of the public investor P's consumption share (f t ) and the disaster intensity under P's beliefs (λ t ). Panel A considers the case when α = 1. Panel B considers the case when α = 0. Again, α = 1 means that a 1-standard deviation increase in the disaster intensity from its long-run mean effectively increases the dealers' relative risk aversion against disasters by 1 in the homogeneous-agent economy.
where the public and dealers share a lot of risks. In contrasts, Panel B shows that when the dealers have time-varying aversion to jump risks, the relationship is much more complex.
For low levels of the intensity the patterns is the same as before since the dealers are as willing (or even more willing) to sell crash insurance. However, as λ rises, the clears become more averse to jump risk and less willing to provide insurance. When the intensity becomes high enough, the dealers become so averse to jump risk that they even begin to become buyers of insurance rather than sellers. Figure 8 plots the jump risk premium, as measured by λ Q /λ, as a function of the public consumption share and the jump intensity. In the case of α = 0, the jump risk premium rises as there are fewer dealers to hold the jump risks. When α = 1, the jump risk premium falls as there are more dealers when λ is low. When λ is high enough, this relationship reverses and the premium rises as there are more dealers. The reason for this is that as λ rises, the dealers become more risk averse and eventually demand a higher premium than the public; this relation can be seen be following the curve with f t = 0, corresponding to the case where there are only dealers.
Next, we examine the relation between the net public purchase for crash insurance and the disaster risk premium in equilibrium. We do so by first holding constant the consumption share of the public investors f t while letting the disaster intensity λ t vary over time. The results are in Figure 9 . When α = 1, for each of the consumption share considered (f t = 0.9, 0.8, 0.5), the model predicts a negative relation between the net public purchase for crash insurance and risk premium. In contrast, when α = 0, i.e., when the dealers have constant risk aversion against disaster risk, both the net public purchase and the disaster risk premium remain constant while the disaster intensity fluctuates.
This comparison again highlights the key role played by the dealers' time-varying aversion against disaster risk in our model. disaster intensity, there is a unique relation between the two quantities: as consumption share of the public investors changes from 0 to 1, the net public purchase as defined in (18) starts at 0, reaches its peak at 11%, then falls back to 0 eventually. The limiting case where public investors own all the aggregate endowment is marked by the red circle on the y-axis. In this process, because the relative amount of risk sharing obtained by the public investors is falling as they gain more consumption share, the disaster risk premium in equilibrium rises monotonically until it reaches the limit of e γd = 7.7.
When α = 1, the relation between the net public purchase for crash insurance and disaster risk premium is qualitatively similar to that in Panel B when the disaster intensity is not too high. The equilibrium where public investors own all the endowment is still identical regardless of the level of disaster intensity (again marked by the red circle that sits on the line of zero net public purchase for crash insurance), but the other extreme where the dealers own all the endowment will have different risk premium for different disaster intensity. This result is simply due to the dealers' time-varying risk aversion.
When λ t is sufficiently high, the dealers can become so averse to disaster risk that, despite of their optimist beliefs about the chances of disasters, they still demand a higher premium than the public investors would. For this reason, when λ t is sufficiently high, the net public purchase for crash insurance turns negative, i.e., public investors are now insuring the dealers against disasters, and the disaster risk premium in the economy exceeds the highest level in the case with constant risk aversion.
While Figure 10 suggests that variation in consumption share can by itself generate either positive or negative relation between net public purchase for crash insurance and the risk premium, this channel is likely too weak in the time series. This is because the consumption share moves slowly outside disasters. In contrast, because disaster intensity is relatively volatile, the negative relation identified in Figure 9 will be tend to dominate in the time series.
Extension
Our main model presented in Section 3.2 captures a number of the key features we have found in the data. In particular, the model captures the fact that when equilibrium public buying is low, risk premia may be high as this may correspond to time when dealers are (or act as if they are) more risk averse. However, as in Chen, Joslin, and Tran (2012) , wealth moves slowly between the public sector and dealers outside of disasters and only through the crash insurance premiums. In this section, we generalize our main model to account for more general time variation in the relative wealth of the public and dealers.
Consider the case where public and dealers not only view the disaster events differently, but also disagree about the future path of the likelihood of disasters. Specifically, consider the more general form of (12) where dP D dP P = ρ Nt e (1−ρ) t 0 λsds × e − s 0 θsdW λ s − t 0 θ 2 s ds .
and θ s is some process satisfying Novikov's condition. For example, with an appropriate chose of θ t , we may have that the dealer will believe that the dynamics of the λ t are
where W λ,D t is a standard Brownian motion under the dealer's beliefs.
An example we have in mind is that the dealer may believe that when the intensity is high, it will mean revert more quickly to the steady state than it actually will. When this is the case, the dealer will make bets with the public that the intensity will fall. This will cause the public's relative wealth to grow if the intensity continues to rise. Thus even if the dealers are becoming more risk averse as the intensity rises, there will be a greater demand for crash protection from the public and in equilibrium the net effect can be that the size of the insurance market increases. Without this additional trading incentive, the relative wealth of the public and dealers will be nearly constant over short horizons.
This extension allows us to capture some patterns seen in the crisis. In Figure 1 , we saw that in the early stages of the crisis, the demand for crash insurance spiked and subsequently bottomed out as we reached the later stages. In Figure 3 , we saw that, according to our regression analysis, expected excess returns were flat (or fell) in the early part of the crisis and then increased dramatically in the later stages.
The extended model can capture these types of features. To see this, we extend our base model with the additional assumption that the dealers believe that λ t mean reverts ten times faster than the public (a half life of 0.48 years versus 4.8 years.) For simplicity, we assume that over a two year period the disaster intensity rises from its steady value of 1.7% at a rate of 1%/year to 3.7%. We initialize the public with a planner weight such that they initially represent 25% of consumption. We also model the implied risk aversion of the dealer to remain constant at γ = 4 in the beginning of the sample and then increase quadratically to γ = 6.5 at the end of the period. Figure 11 plots the resulting market size (Panel A) and risk premium (Panel B), as measured by λ Q − λ P . Generally, the patterns we see are qualitatively similar to those found in Figure 1 and Figure 3 . The public begins buying more insurance as the dealers lose money on their λ bets. As the crisis deepens, for a hypothetical history where the intensity rises from 1.7% to 3.7% over a two year period. The public has an initial consumption fraction of 0.25. The dealer's relative risk aversion is initially γ = 4 and then rises in the second half quadratically to γ = 6.5.
the dealers start to become very risk averse and the market dries up to the point where the dealers even become buyers of protection. Across this time period, the risk premium at first increases very slowly until the dealers are no longer willing to hold the risk and the premium begins to increase rapidly.
Conclusion
The options market is an integral part of the risk sharing mechanism in the economy, where the risk bearing capacity of the intermediaries play a key role in determining not only the prices and equilibrium demand for options, but also the risk premium in the aggregate economy.
We provide evidence that measures of the amount of trading between public investors and financial intermediaries on DOTM SPX puts have strong predictive power for future market excess returns. The PNBO volume of public investors are negatively associated with future market returns up to the 4 months ahead. PNBO are negatively associated with the expensiveness of the DOTM index puts and positively associated with the change in broker-dealer leverage. Moreover, the information that PNBO contains about the market risk premium is not captured by the standard financial and macro variables. This result is consistent with the prediction of the intermediary-based asset pricing models in that time-varying intermediary constraints can drive the aggregate risk premium.
To explain these findings, we build a general equilibrium model of a market for the crash insurance market, which captures the dynamic relation between the net demand by public investors and the disaster risk premium. As dealers become more constrained and averse to disaster risk when the probability of disaster risk is high, their risk sharing capacity is reduced, causing the equilibrium net public purchase for crash insurance to fall and the disaster risk premium to rise.
